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1 Introduction
Theory of contracts over the last few decades has mainly dealt with contracts
written on verifiable information, and on contracts which can be enforced by
a third party like courts. An implication of this is that disputes never arise,
which is in contrast to evidence on employment contracts (see next Section for
more details on this). This paper aims to investigate the implications of relaxing
this assumption and to the growing theoretical literature in subjective contracts
(Levin (2004), Macleod (2003)). We are motivated by the mere observations that
disputes often arise, and that contracts are written and incentives are provided
in number of transactions based on subjective evaluation (Prendergast (1999)).
Incentives such as bonus payments, promotions or rewards in organizations are
often made using subjective criteria. For example doctors under National Health
Service1 in United Kingdom proceed in the NHS hierarchy based on courses
taken, years of experience, administration, errors made and publications. But
the contracts and the rules which are provided to the doctors do not specify
objectively how much weight is assigned to each of these factors and only gives a
broad indication of the job requirement. Exactly specifying the job requirements
in this case may not only distort behavior (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)) of
the doctors but may also be diﬃcult to specify since medicine is a complex good.
The use of such measures can lead to disputes. Employees may find their year
end bonus lower than their expectations. Recently there has been significant
controversy over the bonus scheme designed in the advertisement firm WPP
1http://www.modern.nhs.uk
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(Wire and Plastic Products)2. The bonus scheme stated that bonuses would
be paid out if the company remained amongst the top two in the industry. No
other details regarding the ranking of the firms in the industry were given. Share
holders of the company have complained that the scheme is too vague and that
this was a way for the management to award themselves bonuses.
Subjective assessments or potential non-verifiability of outcomes can lead to
disputes and conflicts. The possibility of disputes not only creates transaction
cost due to cost of disputes but may also make it more diﬃcult to write a
contract which provides correct incentives to the agent.
Transaction costs regarding the execution of contracts arise primarily due to
gaps in contracts (Ayres and Gertner (1991)) or the inability of the contracting
parties to write a contract based on verifiable performance. Gaps in contracts
result in incomplete contracts which are dealt with renegotiation by the con-
tracting parties (Hart and Moore, 1988). Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and
Hart and Moore (2004) have discussed the issue of strategic ambiguity where
the principal might gain by writing a contract which is vague and incomplete.
This allows the principal more flexibility by fixing a payment but allowing the
possibility of changing this later. The ineﬃciencies involved due to gaps in con-
tracts is tackled by the hold-up literature. A key feature of these models is the
assumption that only contracts which are based on verifiable information can be
enforced, and that the renegotiation takes place under the threat of the original
contract.
2http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3631069.stm
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The main distinction from the incomplete contract literature is that we show
that a contract can be written under potential non-verifiability, and that this
contract can improve the trade surplus, as long as there is some arbitrator or a
mediator present to address the dispute which may arise due to potential non-
verifiability. In fact, we postulate that in this case contracts can be used even
if the mediator or the arbitrator does not learn the true state of nature after
the contract has been performed, and we show that this may lead, depending
on the environment, to either a higher than first-best eﬀort by the agent or to
the eﬃcient level of eﬀort.
The inability of contracting parties to write a contract based on verifiable
performance results from the contracting parties being unable to write con-
tracts on objective measures. Previous literature has pointed out the presence
of ineﬃciency in contracting under subjective assessment (Prendergast (1999)
and Macleod (2003)). Macleod (2003) shows that in case of subjective eval-
uation, the principal is more likely to provide a favorable assessment for the
agent’s performance than is optimal, and this leads to ineﬃciency in contracts.
Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Prendergast (1999) point out that subjective
evaluation can lead to favoritism by the principal/supervisor and this may lead
to ineﬃciency in the relationship. There is a compression of the evaluation of
the agent towards a norm. However, in this strand of research the assumption
that only contracts which are based on verifiable information can be enforced is
maintained.3
3A related work here is the investigation of long-run contractual relationships when states
are not verfiable to the enforcement agency (Levin (2003)). Here contracts are implicit.
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In this paper we evaluate instead contracts which are written on potentially
non-verifiable states. This will give rise to enforcement problems. The model
consists of a contractual relationship between the principal and the agent where
the principal cannot observe eﬀort made by the agent. The outcome is observed
by both the principal and the agent but may not be possible to be verified
to a third party. Both the agent and principal report their assessment of the
outcome to a third party, which can either be the court, arbitrator, mediator
or any alternative dispute resolution body4. This gives both, the principal and
the agent, an incentive to mis-report about the evaluation since any salary or
reward for the outcome is a transfer from the principal to the agent5. Here we
explicitly model the court’s or the tribunal’s role in evaluating the performance.
We view the court as an active player who attempts to find information
about the potentially non-verifiable state, and uses any such information to
resolve disputes over the states. We discuss two possible method or rules the
tribunal may use in order to determine performance. The first method, which
we call arbitration, is used when the court or tribunal itself observes an added
signal about the performance, but this signal is an imperfect one. This is similar
to instances when the dispute goes to an arbitrator or the court and they spend
considerable amount of time and eﬀort to find the truth. In this case when the
arbitrator gets an extra signal, the rule or the mechanism used to determine the
4 In UK labour disputes regarding performance pay generally go the Employment Appeals
Tribunal.
5The principal-agent play a constant sum game. This has been discussed in Macleod and
Malcomson (1989), Baker et.al. (1994). Pendergast (1999) discusses this issue as an issue of
theft.
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final payment to the agent is a truth-telling one.
The second rule depends only on the reports of the principal and the agent.
This we call mediation or conciliation. In this case there is no added restriction
of a truth telling. The only extra restriction which is used on this rule is that
the rule strikes a compromise between the claims made by the principal and
the agent. This we believe is similar to the case when the employer and the
employee may take their dispute to an outside tribunal.
We postpone a discussion of the assumptions behind these two dispute-
resolution mechanisms for the next Section. Under both the legal rules or
mechanism we find that one of the contracting parties or both always go to
the tribunal or the court. Both expect if the appeal is successful to get the
contract changed in their favour. The agent will go to court if the outcome is
a failure and claim success and in case of success the principal will go to court
and claim failure. So the principal not only wants to avoid failure since she does
not get any benefit but also since she cannot prove it and may still have to pay
the agent something. And in case of successful outcome she not only gets the
benefit of success but may also be able to reduce the payment to the agent due
to non-verifiability. So, if there is non-verifiability the principal pays the agent
more compared to objective contracts. The resulting contract depends on the
degree of non-verifiability.
For lower degrees of non-verifiability the contract form is similar to that of
contract written in case of full verifiability, regardless of the rule. For suﬃciently
low verifiability, under arbitration we interestingly get an optimal contract which
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is flat. Under mediation, however, the contract form is that the agent is given
a bonus unless there is absolute failure. This is consistent with the findings
in Macleod (2003) and Prendergast and Topel (1996), that if assessment is
subjective then the principal is more likely to make a favorable ruling about the
agent’s performance.
The second main result in this paper is that, under both legal rules, agent
may be induced to put in the eﬃcient eﬀort level or more than the first-best
level of eﬀort, i.e. the level which can be induced in case incentive contracts can
be written on objectively assessed eﬀort. The primary reason for this result is
that agent can always expect some transfer more than the promised bonus even
if the outcome is failure, and this in turn relaxes the agent’s participation and
incentive compatibility constraints.
2 Contracts and Enforcement
Under the Employments Right Act 19966 in U.K., it is necessary for the em-
ployer or principal to provide a written statement of terms and conditions of
employment. The document may state that a contractual relationship exists and
what its primary content is. This may not include full details of the relationship
like terms and conditions for rewards and promotions7. Other details may be
missing; for example, an oﬃce assistant’s contract may not state that the job
6http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996018.htm
7The Higher Education Roles Analysis (2004) provides a detailed list of tasks for academics
in UK but does not provide any indication regarding the conditions for salary increases or
promotions.
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requires answering phones. Task of answering phones for an oﬃce assistant may
be considered routine and therefore may be left out of the written document.
But this may become an issue if the employer finds that the task is not being
done to her liking and this may result in a dispute. For example Nationwide
Building Society lays emphasis on level of performance, training, resources and
guidance provided, time scales set and, finally, the possible reasons for perfor-
mance standards not being met. The last issue is in fact an important one.
Even if performance standards are well set, disputes occur due to the reasons
for non-performance or sub par performance8. In case of a dispute, the problem
legally becomes a contractual one. It is well documented in the industrial rela-
tion literature that one of the main reasons for employee grievances is that the
employees are not satisfied with the way they have been graded or their per-
formance evaluated9. These disputes create significant transaction costs. First
it may be diﬃcult for the employer to provide the employee proper incentives
and the secondly there is the cost of the dispute itself. In UK, 383 working
days were lost due to pay disputes in year 2000 and this accounted for 77% of
the total working day lost10. In Northern Ireland, Labour Relation Agency, an
alternative dispute resolution board released the following data: out of the total
of 5073 labour disputes they dealt with 767 were regarding wage order disputes
8 In Davison v. Kent (1975), the court ruled in favour of Ms Davison after she had in-
correctly assembled 500 components, since the company failed to provide proper guidance
regarding assembling the parts.
9A detailed study of grivance mechanism and procedures in 72 UK public and private
sector work places can be found in Industrial Relations Services report Handling Employee
Grievances: Part 1, Employment Trends No. 636 July (1997)
10Davies, J. (2001) ‘Labour Disputes in 2000’, Labour Market Trends, June 301-13.
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and 682 were breach of contract disputes11 . This suggests that a significant
number of disputes arise due to wage order and contract breaches.
Performance disputes generally go to a tribunal (in UK it goes to the In-
dustrial Tribunal ), or the court. Given, common law and the civil code12, the
legal system promotes a dispute resolution process which is consistent with ap-
plication of the dispute resolution procedures between individuals and across
organizations, a dispute resolution scheme which is impartial, use of relevant
information accurately by the mechanism, scope to change the outcome if re-
quired, allowing for representation of interests of both the employer and the
employee and others involved and to adopt an eﬃcient and fair standard. The
tribunal mechanism is formal and the court or the tribunal spends a consider-
able amount of time and eﬀort to learn the truth. Since in the tribunal system
the adjudicator of the case is the arbitrator for the rest of the paper, note that
we will use the courts and tribunals synonymously and judges and arbitrators
synonymously.
The second method for resolving disputes is much more informal. This
is something called either mediation or conciliation. The second mechanism
basically consist of an outside conciliator or a mediator who helps bring the
parties come to an agreement13. Unlike arbitration, conciliation or mediation
is not legally binding. The ruling of the mediator holds only if both parties
agree to the ruling. In England and Wales the alternative dispute resolution
11Labour Relation Agency Annual Review of Performance 2002-2003. www.lra.org.uk
12Check Employment Rights Act 1996
1996 Chapter 18 Section 23. United Kingdom.
13http://www.acas.org.uk/services/dispute_mediation.html
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scheme is provided by ACAS, a government funded body14. The ACAS web-
site lists the following as the main diﬀerence between the alternative dispute
resolution scheme and tribunal, “the arbitration hearing is informal and non-
confrontational”. The main method the alternative scheme works is that the
mediator or conciliator talks with disputing parties together and individually
and helps them reach a resolution.
3 Model
Consider a risk neutral principal and a risk neutral agent contract to produce a
product, y, in the future. The agent exerts eﬀort e. Eﬀort can take three possible
values: 0, ε and 1 such that ε ∈ (0, 1). The disutility of eﬀort is given by the
function ψ(e), which is continuos and ψ(0) = 0. ψ(e) is strictly increasing and
convex. The outcome of a project y is stochastic and eﬀort-dependent with y ∈
{0, BL, B}, B > BL > 0, Pr(y = BL | e) = πˆ(e) and Pr(y = B | e) = π(e),π ∈
(0, 1), πˆ ∈ (0, 1), π+ πˆ ∈ (0, 1). Let us denote ∆π2 = π(1)−π(ε), ∆π1 = π(ε)−
π(0), ∆πˆ2 = πˆ(1)− πˆ(ε), ∆πˆ1 = πˆ(ε)− πˆ(0).We assume also that the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds, i.e. ∆π2π(ε) >
∆πˆ2
πˆ(ε) and
∆π1
π(0) >
∆πˆ1
πˆ(0) .
In addition we assume that π(e) and πˆ(e) are strictly increasing and concave.
Assume also that the agent can, instead, supply her labour endowment for other
projects. The expected payoﬀ of the alternative employment is normalized to
zero.
14http://www.acas.org.uk
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Consider also a principal who owns the produced ‘object’ and has a utility
function S(y). Let for simplicity S(y) = y. Assume that
argmax
e
{π(e)B + πˆ(e)BL − ψ(e)} ≡ eo > 0
and so there are gains from ex ante trade between the principal and the agent.
In particular, let eo = ε : the ex-ante eﬃcient level of eﬀort is the intermediate
one.
The agent receives w + t(y). w is the up-front payment and t(y) is the
amount the agent gets after completion depending on the outcome. The up-front
payment w to the agent establishes an employment relationship and transfers
the ownership of the project to the principal before the eﬀort is exerted.
The principal does not observe the eﬀort exerted by the agent but observes
the outcome. The outcome of the project is common knowledge between the
principal and the agent but potentially non-verifiable by a third party. The
principal provides a payment scheme t(y) which is a function of the outcome
of the project. Suppose that the agent is protected with limited-liability15 ,
and denote w + t(0) = w, w + t(BL) = w + bL and w + t(B) = w + b, with
w ≥ 0, bL ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0. With such transfers, the agent is rewarded for good
performance (measured by the quality of the completed project), while w is the
state-independent component of the transfer.
The problem of providing correct incentives is aggravated by the fact that
15 In the absence of risk, limited liability makes it diﬃcult to provide incentives.
Sappington(1983)
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the outcome is potentially non-verifiable. In this case, a state-dependent con-
tract could emerge as an implicit contract or due to ‘trust’ (Levin (2003)). If
y is not verifiable, a performance-dependent contract could in principle also be
one which is based on ‘subjective valuations’. This is investigated in, for in-
stance, Prendergast and Topel (1996), Prendergast (1993) and Macleod (2003).
There, the terms of the contract can be verified, and the court simply enforces
the written contract. Crucially, this contract may include compulsory payments
from the principal to a third party (like the court itself). Here, we investigate
instead the emergence, in one-oﬀ relationships with no transfers to third par-
ties being feasible, of performance-dependent contracts due to the presence of
an arbitrator or mediator who can resolve any dispute that may arise over the
terms of a contract. In particular, we assume that the arbitrator or the me-
diator can enforce a transfer rule which depends on the information I it gets.
This information I the court or the tribunal may get itself or may be from the
other sources including the contracting parties. In particular, we allow for the
court to settle any dispute over the state by, implementing its ruling w + h(I),
which specifies explicitly a transfer h from the principal to the agent given the
information I available to the court. Note that the information I may consist
of the reports the court receives from the contracting parties or may be what
it has collected itself. One can think of I as being determined, among oth-
ers, by the ‘cases’ presented by the disputing parties, by who has initiated the
judicial process, by any external/independent information on the state of the
world. Notice, that we allow for h(I) to be a stochastic transfer, to capture any
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randomness in the ability of the court to infer the true state of the world. Im-
portantly, we also show that, at least in the environment we consider here, such
an institutional arrangement is welfare-improving relative to contracts based on
‘subjective valuations’.
3.1 Timing
The timing of the game is the following:
• First, the principal oﬀers the contract {w, t(y)}.
• The agent either rejects the contract and takes up the alternative employ-
ment attaining a payoﬀ of 0, or accepts the contract, receives w and exerts
eﬀort e.
• The state of the world y is realized according to the probability distribution
{π(e), πˆ(e)}.
• The principal and the agent decide simultaneously and independently
whether they will challenge the state of the world, and thereby the trans-
fer/bonus t(y) which is specified by the contract.
• If either challenges the quality of the project, they make their reports and
the third party collects independent evidence. Given available information,
the court then makes a ruling h(I).
• If none challenges the contract, the contract t(y) is fulfilled.
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3.2 Information Structure and Principles of Dispute Res-
olution
The information content of the collected evidence is as follows. Assume that,
with probability ξ < 1, the third party possesses compelling evidence about
the true quality of the project completed. With probability 1− ξ, on the other
hand, the collected evidence amounts to the tribunal receiving an imperfect cost
less signal of the quality of the project σ ∈ Σ, with Σ ⊆ R, according to the
joint p.d.f. f(σ, q), where q ∈ Q ⊆ R. This joint p.d.f. depends on the exerted
level of eﬀort - we drop for expositional simplicity this dependence whenever
there is no risk of confusion. The joint p.d.f. has full support with respect
to σ when q ∈ {0, BL, B}, and is also such that f(σ, q) = 0 for any σ ∈ Σ
when q /∈ {0, BL, B}. In addition,
R
Σ f(σ, B)dσ = π(e),
R
Σ f(σ, BL)dσ = πˆ(e).
The parties do not observe this signal σ prior to challenging the contract.We
can think of this signal as something the third body may learn itself about the
relationship at the time it is asked to make the ruling on the dispute. Let us also
assume that signals and outcomes are aﬃliated, f(σ, y0)f(σ, y) ≤ f(σ0.y0)f(σ, y)
for any σ0 ≤ σ, y0 ≤ y ; the higher the signal, the more likely it is that output
is high.
Assume that if the court is convinced that the outcome is y then it enforces
the original contract. If on the other hand the court is not certain about the true
state of the world, then it enforces a transfer which depends on the information
itself gathers and the ‘claims’ (or ‘cases’) of the parties16 . In particular, if the
16Damages awarded are just transfers between the parties. Damages are not dependent on
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agent claims that the state of the world is such that, based on the contract
t(y), she should receive a bonus ma ∈ {0, bL, b} and the principal claims that
the state of the world is such that, based on the contract t(y), she should only
pay a bonus mp ∈ {0, bL, b} then the ruling of the court is that the bonus to
the agent should be h(σ,ma,mp). Note that players making claims about the
bonus is equivalent to players making claims about the state of the world. Due
to limited liability, let h ≥ 0, and note that h can be thought of as the bonus to
the worker the court is willing to rule for, in the absence of compelling evidence
on the state of the world.
It follows that the expected bonus the court will enforce is ξt(y) + (1 −
ξ)η(e,ma,mp), where
η(e,ma,mp) ≡
Z
Σ
Z
Q
f(σ, q)h(σ,ma,mp)dσdq
is the expected, prior to the realization of outcome, bonus received by the worker
if it is anticipated that the state is challenged in court. Thus, the agent’s
expected payoﬀ if the contract goes to court is
w + ξt(y) + (1− ξ)η(e,ma,mp)− ψ(e)
while her expected payoﬀ if the original contract is fulfilled is t(y)− ψ(e). The
the party who initiates the dispute. This implicit assumption is without loss of generality, as
the identity of who initiates the dispute bears no informational content.
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principal’s expected payoﬀ if it is anticipated that the contract goes to court is
y − {w + ξt(y) + (1− ξ)η(e,ma,mp)}
while his payoﬀ if the original contract is anticipated to be fulfilled is y − t(y).
Define δ(0), δ(BL) and δ(B) by the following three equations respectively.
w + δ(0) = w + (1− ξ)
Z
Σ
f(σ | 0)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ
w + bL + δ(BL) = w + ξbL + (1− ξ)
Z
Σ
f(σ | BL)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ
w + b+ δ(B) = w + ξb+ (1− ξ)
Z
Σ
f(σ | B)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ.
δ(y) is the agent’s anticipated gain if he goes to court. Note that δ0s depend
on the bonuses in the contract, the ‘claims’ {ma,mp} and the quality of the
verification technology ξ; for expositional simplicity we drop, whenever there is
no risk of confusion.
In the next Sections, we turn to the determination of the optimal contract.17
We believe that the model can be extended to the case when w is given after
the completion of the contract, with the object being ‘owned’ by the agent 18
17Allowing non-verifiable eﬀort, which can nevertheless be observed by the principal and
the agent would complicate matters. The reason is that then, and in the presence of a dispute
resolution mechanism, the issue of what weights should eﬀort and perfomance bear in the
contract arises. To isolate the implications of arbitration and mediation we refrain from
investigating this, nevertheless, very interesting question. We tackle this important issue in a
companion paper.
18 If y is observable but non-verifiable, there is no court of law to enforce some state-
dependent contract and the ownership right of the ‘object’ falls with the agent, then we
have trade only if the project is not a failure, i.e. only if S(y) ≥ p(y), where p(y) is the
price the agent can ensure from another party. That is, after setting w = 0 for exposi-
tional simplicity, t(y) = max{p(y), p(y) + θ(BL − p(BL)}, and if y ≥ p(y) then e = eθ ≡
16
and in the case when it is costly to go to a court.19
4 Benchmark Cases
We now consider three extreme cases. First, when the outcome is completely
verifiable. Second, when the outcome is completely non-verifiable. Finally,
when the outcome is imperfectly verifiable and there is a third party which
administers a flat (i.e. performance-independent) bonus to the agent whenever a
dispute arises and there is not compelling evidence for the quality of the project,
while it simply enforces the contract if there is suﬃcient evidence concerning
performance.
4.1 Outcome is Verifiable
If eﬀort is the agent’s private information, but y is verifiable (i.e. ξ = 1), and
ψ(e) ≥ Z(e)π(e), where Z(0) ≡ 0, Z(ε) ≡ ∆ψ1/∆π1,∆ψ1 ≡ ψ(ε)−ψ(0) = ψ(ε),
Z(1) ≡ ∆ψ2/∆π2 and ∆ψ2 ≡ ψ(1) − ψ(ε), then the principal can induce the
eﬀort level in question by means of a contract bL = 0, b = Z(e) and w = ψ(e)−
argmax{π(e)[p(B)(1 − θ) + θB] + πˆ(e)[p(BL)(1 − θ) + θBL] − ψ(e)}, where θ is the bar-
gaining power of the agent. This is the hold-up scenario, which, if θ < 1, features ineﬀcient
investment/eﬀort, i.e. eθ < eo.
Suppose now that y is observable but non-verifiable, there is a court of law to enforce some
state-dependent contract (possibly diﬀerent than the original) - i.e. ξ < 1- but the ownership
right of the ‘object’ falls with the agent. Then, and in contrast to our model above, there
may be scope for re-negotiation - that is, there may be ex post trade on voluntarily agreed
new terms. Such scope will exist if the agent can sell the object ex post to a third party at a
price p(y) with p(y) ≥ max{t∗(y), S(y)− t∗(y)}, where t∗(y) ∈ {t(y), t(y) + δ(y)} depending
on whether, in the absence of re-negotiation, the original contract is fulfilled or not.
19 In this case the incentive to go to court is determined by δ(y) − k where k is the cost
of challenging the contract, possibly the cost of the tribunal collecting the evdience which is
passed onto the disputing parties. In this case, out of court settlements can emerge. This
scenario diﬀers from the ‘subjective valuation’ contract investigated by, for instance, MacLeod
(2003) in that k is fixed and cannot be chosen optimally.
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π(e)Z(e). This follows directly from observing that under such contract the par-
ticipation constraint π(e)b + πˆ(e)bL ≥ ψ(e) is just satisfied and the agent finds it
to her benefit to exert eﬀort e, i.e. e = argmaxx∈{0,ε,1}{π(x)b+ πˆ(x)bL−ψ(x)}.
Thus, in this case, the existence of complete contracts leads to production at
minimum cost ψ(e), as in the first-best outcome, despite asymmetric informa-
tion regarding eﬀort.
If, however, ψ(e) < Z(e)π(e) then asymmetric information regarding eﬀort
has a bite when it comes to inducing eﬀort level e. In particular, now, if the
principal wants to induce a positive level of eﬀort e, he would need to incur a
total cost of π(e)Z(e). The formal derivation of this is standard and can be found
in Appendix 1. Here we only present the intuition. Note that the problem of the
agent is well-behaved, and, in particular, that the marginal benefit of exerting
eﬀort is strictly increasing with either of the bonuses, and that the benefit and
cost functions of eﬀort are concave and convex, respectively. Then, the minimum
monetary cost, for any given down-payment w, at which the principal can induce
eﬀort level e > 0 is attained when the ‘downward local incentive compatibility
constraint’ is binding, i.e.
∆πˆjbL +∆πjb = ∆ψj , j = 1, 2.
Here, if e = ε then j = 1, while if e = 1 then j = 2. The above equation for
j = 1 comes from the indiﬀerence of the agent between exerting eﬀort level ε and
18
no eﬀort; similarly for j = 2.20 It follows that bL =
∆ψj−∆πjb
∆πˆj
≡ ∆πj [Z(e)−b]∆πˆj .
So, the bonuses, when the quality is of an intermediate and high level, are
substitutes. Recall that for any given down-payment w, that the expected cost
to the principal is πb+ πˆbL.Therefore increasing the bonus when the outcome is
a success leads to a higher cost by π(ε) while it saves on the bonus given when
the state is BL by an amount of πˆ(e)
∆πj
∆πˆj
. Due to MLRP the latter is larger than
the former and, so, increasing b as much as possible is optimal for the principal.
The principal is constrained by the requirement that bL ≥ 0 and the agent’s
participation constraint that π(e)b+ πˆ(e)bL+w ≥ ψ(e). Since ψ(e) < Z(e)π(e)
and w ≥ 0, we clearly, then, have that the participation constraint is slack.
Therefore, b = Z(e) and thereby bL = 0. As down-payments are costly we
also have that w = 0. So the total cost of inducing e is indeed π(e)Z(e). Note
that due to convexity of the utility cost ψ and the concavity of probability of
success π we have that Z(1) > Z(ε). So, the bonus for success is increasing with
implemented eﬀort.
Accordingly, for any given eﬀort level the principal wants to induce, the
complete contract has bL = 0, b = Z(e) and w = max{0,ψ(e)− Z(e)π(e)}, and
total production costs are given by max{ψ(e), Z(e)π(e)}. Observe also that the
benefit from exerting eﬀort levels ε and 1, instead of zero eﬀort, are ∆πˆ1BL +
∆π1B and [∆πˆ1 +∆πˆ2]BL + [∆π1 +∆π2]B respectively.
20 If the agent’s problem is well behaved then an agent who is indiﬀerent between eﬀort
e > 0 and the immediately lower eﬀort level, prefers also (strictly) eﬀort e over any other
eﬀort level.
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Assume hereafter that ψ(ε) < Z(ε)π(ε). It follows then directly that if
max{π(1)Z(1),ψ(1)} ≥ [∆πˆ1 +∆πˆ2]BL + [∆π1 +∆π2]B
and
π(ε)Z(ε) ≥ ∆πˆ1BL +∆π1B,
then the principal finds it optimal to induce no eﬀort.This is the standard com-
plete contract scenario with ineﬃcient investment/eﬀort due to limited liability.
Assume hereafter that this is indeed the case. Then, we have:
Proposition 1 The optimal complete contract will be bL = b = 0 in order to
induce eﬀort e = 0.Also, it will be bL = 0 and b = Z(e) > 0 to induce e = ε or
e = 1. The Principal will choose to induce e = 0.
4.2 Outcome is Non-Verifiable
If y is observable but non-verifiable, and there is no enforcement mechanism,
then ex post, i.e. once the agent has exerted eﬀort, the principal has no incentive
to pay a bonus. Thus, again, t(y) ≡ 0 and e = 0. This is one of the incomplete
contract scenarios, with zero investment/eﬀort (Grossman and Hart(1986)).
If however courts exist to simply enforce contracts which are based on ver-
ifiable information, we have that the principal can oﬀer a contract which is
based on ‘subjective valuations’. This contract is oﬀered by the principal, prior
to the agent exerting eﬀort, and induces truth-telling by both parties once the
state is realized. In more detail, such contract specifies a transfer to the agent
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as a function of the parties’ reports to courts about the state, k(ra, rp), with
ra, rp ∈ {0, BL, B} being the reports of the agent and principal respectively and
k(.) ≥ 0 satisfying:
e∗ = argmax
e
π(e)k(B,B) + πˆ(e)k(BL, BL) + [1− π(e)− πˆ(e)]k(0, 0)− ψ(e)
(1)
π(e∗)k(B,B) + πˆ(e∗)k(BL, BL) + [1− π(e∗)− πˆ(e∗)]k(0, 0) ≥ ψ(e∗) (2)
k(y, y) ≥ k(ra, y) for any y, ra 6= y (3)
k(y, y) ≤ k(y, rp) for any y, ra 6= y. (4)
The first constraint is the incentive-compatibility constraint of the agent when
she chooses her eﬀort given that she anticipates truth-telling, while the second is
her participation constraint. The third constraint requires truth-telling by the
agent given the state y and given that the principal reports truthfully. Similarly,
the last constraint is the truth-telling constraint for the principal himself given
the state y. The principal, then, maximizes his expected payoﬀ
π(e∗)[B − k(B,B)] + πˆ(e∗)[BL − k(BL, BL)]− [1− π(e∗)− πˆ(e∗)]k(0, 0)
with respect to k(ra, rp) for any ra, rp subject to the above constraints. It
turns out that the only flat transfers, k(ra, rp) = k¯ for any ra, rp, induce truth-
telling.21 Thus, for any given flat transfer, the agent finds it optimal to exert no
21For truth-telling in the court of law to be a Nash equilibrium, given any state y, it must
be that k(y, y) ≥ k(ra, y) and k(y, y) ≤ k(y, rp) for any ra 6= y and any rp 6= y. It follows that
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eﬀort, and thereby the principal finds it optimal to oﬀer no transfers.
Consider now the case when y is unobservable. Now, no state-dependent
contract can emerge. So, the agent has an incentive to exert no eﬀort, and
thereby the principal has no incentive to pay any bonus; that is, t(y) ≡ 0 and
e = 0.
The discussion above emphasizes that as long as the court, if there is any,
aims either at simply enforcing contracts which are based on verifiable informa-
tion or at inducing truth-telling by disputing parties, without using any extra
information for the performance, then the outcome is the one of zero eﬀort and
zero payments from the employer to the agent.
4.3 The Flat Dispute-resolution Rule
Consider, now the intermediate case of imperfect verification (0 < ξ < 1) by a
dispute resolution mechanism, with t(y) being the bonus only if there is com-
pelling evidence about performance and k¯ ≥ 0 being the bonus otherwise. Note
that this rule could be one of all possible rules available to either an arbitrator
or a mediator.
Note first that under such a rule both the principal and the agent are in-
diﬀerent over their reports to the tribunal, after a dispute has been arisen: if
compelling evidence for y is found then the transfer t(y) is administered, while
k¯ is the enforced bonus otherwise. That is, such a rule is truth-telling. It
k(BL, BL) ≤ k(BL, 0) ≤ k(0, 0) ≤ k(0, BL) ≤ k(BL, BL), that k(B,B) ≤ k(B, 0) ≤ k(0, 0) ≤
k(0, B) ≤ k(B,B) and that k(B,B) ≤ k(B,BL) ≤ k(BL, BL) ≤ k(BL, B) ≤ k(B,B). This
can only hold if k(ra, rp) = k for any ra, rp.
22
turns out that the agent’s anticipated gain if he goes to court, given state y, is
δ(y) = (1− ξ)[k¯ − t(y)].
Given these anticipated payoﬀs we can find if a dispute will arise. In partic-
ular, given the state y, the parties are involved in the following zero-sum game
(the following matrix contains only the payoﬀ of the agent)
P\A challenge not
challenge t(y) + δ(y) t(y) + δ(y)
not t(y) + δ(y) t(y)
. (5)
Notice that if k¯ > t(y) then challenging the contract is a weakly dominant
strategy for the agent, while if k¯ < t(y) then challenging the contract is a
weakly dominant strategy for the principal. Thus, at any state y, if k¯ 6= t(y) a
dispute will arise, while if k¯ = t(y) parties are indiﬀerent between fulfilling or
not the contract. Let us assume therefore, hereafter, to simplify exposition, that
a dispute will always arise. The principal will go to the court when δ(y) ≤ 0
and the agent will do so when δ(y) ≥ 0.
We turn to the derivation of the optimal contract. Given such a dispute-
resolution rule, we have that the principal oﬀers the contract {w, bL, b} that
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solves the following problem:
max
w≥0,bL≥0,b≥0
π(e∗)[B − ξb] + πˆ(e∗)[BL − ξbL]− w (6)
subject to e∗ = argmax
e
ξ[π(e)b+ πˆ(e)bL]− ψ(e) (7)
w + ξ[π(e∗)b+ πˆ(e∗)bL] + (1− ξ)k¯ ≥ ψ(e∗). (8)
To facilitate a simple comparison between the solution of this problem and the
complete contract discussed in Section 4.1 above, note that the non-verifiability
of information and the presence of a court that administers a flat bonus when-
ever there is no compelling evidence about performance implies that given any
contract {w, bL, b} the actual expected cost to the principal is (1− ξ)k¯ + w +
ξ[π(e)b+ πˆ(e)bL]. The reason is that the court can verify the information - and,
so, the original contract can be implemented - only with probability ξ, while
whenever the court does not find compelling evidence it implements the bonus
k¯. In other words, the non-verifiability of states under such a dipute resolution
rule leads to an additional transfer to the agent of (1 − ξ)[k¯ − C(e)], where
C(e) ≡ π(e)b + πˆ(e)bL is the expected bonus under verifiability. Notice that
this transfer could be negative, i.e. non-verifiability could in principle benefit
either of the contracting parties, but crucially not both.
Note that if ξ = 0 then the agent exerts zero eﬀort, as he expects to receive
w+(1−ξ)k¯ regardless of his eﬀort. As ψ(0) = 0, we have that the principal can
attain minimum possible costs subject to participation and limited lability by
setting b = bL = w = 0. This is the same outcome with that in the incomplete
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contract scenario.
Let now ξ > 0. The above problem then is in fact equivalent to the one under
complete verifiability after defining bonuses now as b0 ≡ ξb and b0L ≡ ξbL and
the utility cost of eﬀort as ψ(e) − (1 − ξ)k¯. Thus, such a rule does not aﬀect
the incentive-compatibility constraints of the agent regarding eﬀort, up to a
proportional decrease of the contract’s bonuses. Note, however, that this rule
relaxes the participation constraint. Also, the agent’s problem is well-defined.
Following the discussion of the optimal complete contract in the previous sub-
section we then have that the contract under non-verifiability is bL = 0, b =
Z(e∗)
ξ , w = max{0,ψ(e∗)− (1− ξ)k¯ − Z(e∗)π(e∗)}. In addition, total monetary
costs are max{ψ(e∗), (1− ξ)k¯ + Z(e∗)π(e∗)}.
Clearly then total monetary costs under imperfect verifiability and a flat
dispute-resolution rule are weakly higher than monetary costs under complete
verifiability, for any given level of eﬀort. In fact, after recalling that Z(ε)π(ε) >
ψ(ε) and Z(0) = ψ(0) = 0 we have that the monetary cost of inducing zero
eﬀort is (1 − ξ)k¯ ≥ 0, while that of inducing eﬀort ε is Z(ε)π(ε) + (1 − ξ)k¯.
Clearly, then the extra monetary cost of inducing eﬀort ε instead of 0 is still
Z(ε)π(ε) and thereby zero eﬀort still dominates the intermediate level of eﬀort
ε. However, zero eﬀort may no longer dominate full eﬀort. To see this, note
first that if π(1)Z(1) > ψ(1), i.e. if full eﬀort cannot be implemented at min-
imum cost while ensuring individual-rationality, then the extra monetary cost
of inducing eﬀort 1 instead of 0 is equal to the extra cost under complete ver-
ifiability, Z(1)π(1). Therefore, zero eﬀort still dominates the full eﬀort. That
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is, in this case, zero eﬀort is again the outcome. If, however, π(1)Z(1) ≤ ψ(1)
then the extra monetary cost of inducing eﬀort 1 instead of 0 when 0 < ξ < 1,
max{π(1)Z(1)+(1− ξ)k¯,ψ(1)}− (1− ξ)k¯, is (weakly) lower than the extra cost
when ξ = 1, ψ(1). This, in turn, implies that full eﬀort can now dominate zero
eﬀort, and thereby be optimal.22 That is, if asymmetric information regarding
eﬀort does not have a bite when it comes to implementing full eﬀort, then incom-
plete verifiability of performance in conjunction with a flat dispute-resolution
rule can lead to over-provision of eﬀort. Specifically, we have
Proposition 2 Suppose that under verifiability of performance the exerted
eﬀort is zero. Then, under incomplete verifiability and a dispute-resolution rule
k¯, zero eﬀort is as well the outcome unless π(1)Z(1) ≤ ψ(1) andmax{π(1)Z(1)+
(1− ξ)k¯,ψ(1)}− (1− ξ)k¯ < [∆πˆ1 +∆πˆ2]BL + [∆π1 +∆π2]B. If the latter is
true then full eﬀort is exerted.
That is, in principle, there can be a suﬃciently worker-friendly flat dispute-
resolution rule k¯ and suﬃciently low degree of verifiability that lead to over-
investment. Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) and DeMeza and Lockwood (2004)
discuss also the possibility of over investment. Laﬀont and Martimort (2002)
discuss the possibility of over-investment arising due to more than two eﬀort
levels in an environment of complete verifiability. In DeMeza and Lockwood
22Note that if max{π(1)Z(1) + (1−ξ)k¯,ψ(1)} − (1−ξ)k¯ < [∆πˆ1+∆πˆ2]BL + [∆π1+∆π2]B
then full eﬀort dominates zero eﬀort. This condition implies that −[∆πˆ1BL + ∆π1B] ≤
∆πˆ2BL + ∆π2B − max{π(1)Z(1) + (1−ξ)k¯,ψ(1)} + (1− ξ)k¯. Also, the fact that zero eﬀort
dominates the intermediate eﬀort implies that ∆πˆ1BL + ∆π1B < π(ε)Z(ε). Combining the
last two conditions we have −π(ε)Z(ε) < ∆πˆ2BL + ∆π2B − max{π(1)Z(1) + (1−ξ)k¯,ψ(1)}
+ (1− ξ)k¯ which in turn implies that full eﬀort also dominates the intermediate eﬀort.
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(2004) the argument is based on a coordination problem between many prin-
cipals and many agents who are randomly matched in pairs under complete
non-verifiability. Here, we see, instead, that the possibility of over-investment
is due to the interaction of imperfect verifiability and a flat dispute-resolution
rule k¯.
This sub-section emphasizes that as long as a third party aims at inducing
truth-telling by disputing parties, without using any extra information, when-
ever there is no compelling evidence, for the performance, then the outcome is
either the one of zero eﬀort and zero payments from the employer to the agent,
or the one of full eﬀort induced by means of a positive bonus only when there
is success and total monetary costs lower than utility costs.
We move to the intermediate case of imperfect verifiability by a third party
which can resolve a dispute by means of a non-flat bonus schedule. That is, we
view the court/tribunal/arbitrator/mediator as an active player who attempts
to find information about the non-verifiable state, and uses any such informa-
tion to resolve disputes over the states. Since such a third party cannot use
a generalized mechanism that includes both the ex post judicial rule (which
settles contractual disputes) and the terms of the original contract, the Reve-
lation Principle does not necessarily hold. Interestingly, the third party may
do better by not using a rule that induces truth-telling. To investigate how the
dispute-resolution rule aﬀects the contract oﬀered by the principal, and whether
any contractual dispute arises, we examine two cases in turn. First, in the next
Section, we visit the case when the court uses a signal-contingent rule which is
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truth-telling and Nash-implementable. We identify this rule with arbitration for
the reasons we discussed in Section 2. In Section 6, then, we turn our attention
to a rule which does not induce truth-telling and, given again our discussion in
Section 2, we call this rule mediation. Specifically, in the absence of compelling
evidence about the state, mediation strikes a compromise between the ‘claims’
made by the two parties whenever a dispute arises.
5 Arbitration
Suppose, here, that the arbitrator commits to some rule h(σ,ma,mp) which
dictates the bonus to the agent if a dispute arises and the court receives a signal
σ when there is no compelling evidence about performance. To induce truth-
telling by the disputing parties as a Nash equilibrium, at any state of the world,
it must be that
Z
Σ
f(σ | y)h(σ, y, y)dσ ≥
Z
Σ
f(σ | y)h(σ,ma, y)dσ for any y,ma 6= y (9)Z
Σ
f(σ | y)h(σ, y, y)dσ ≤
Z
Σ
f(σ | y)h(σ, y,mp)dσ for any y,mp 6= y. (10)
As we have emphasized in Section 2, such rules are akin to an arbitration mech-
anism in an organization. The arbitrator gathers information, and since the
gathering the information is quite detailed and careful we assume here that the
arbitration procedure leads to truth telling. The implications of a mechanism
which uses signals σ, but nevertheless does not lead to revelation of performance
is investigated in Section 6.2
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These incentive-compatibility constraints regarding revelation of performance
can be satisfied by a host of arbitration rules. For instance, an arbitration rule
which disregards completely the disputing parties’ claims, i.e. h(σ,ma,mp)
= h¯(σ) for any ma,mp,σ, is obviously individually rational. The same is true
for a rule with
R
Σ f(σ | y)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ =
R
Σ f(σ | y0)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ for any
ma 6= mb, and y0, y ∈ {ma,mp}, i.e. when the expected bonus, after eﬀort has
been exerted, is performance-independent when a non-trivial dispute arises.23
Focusing on non-flat rules, i.e. on nontrivial signal-dependent transfers
h(σ, y, y), it follows that the expected benefits of the parties, given the state of
the world, δ0s, are outcome-dependent. That is, after letting h¯(σ, y) ≡ h(σ, y, y)
we have
δ(0) = (1− ξ)
Z
Σ
f(σ | 0)h¯(σ, 0)dσ,
δ(BL) = (1− ξ)[
Z
Σ
f(σ | BL)h¯(σ, BL)dσ − bL]
and
δ(B) = (1− ξ)[
Z
Σ
f(σ | B)h¯(σ, B)dσ − b].
Note also that the non-trivial dependence of the arbitration rule on signals σ
imply that h¯(σ, y) > 0 for some signal σ and some outcome y.
Given these anticipated payoﬀs, we can find, by following the steps in Section
4.3, that a dispute will always arise. The principal will go to the court when
δ(y) ≤ 0 and the agent will do so when δ(y) ≥ 0.
23To see this let k(ma,mp, y) ≡
R
Σ f(σ | y0)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ and use the steps in footnote
20 where we analyse the proprties of individually-rational ‘subjective valuation’ contracts.
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We turn to the derivation of the optimal contract. The principal oﬀers the
contract {w, bL, b} that solves the following problem:
max
w≥0,bL≥0,b≥0
π(e∗)[B − ξb] + πˆ(e∗)[BL − ξbL]− (1− ξ)Q(e∗)− w (11)
subject to e∗ = argmax
e
ξ[π(e)b+ πˆ(e)bL] + (1− ξ)Q(e)− ψ(e) (12)
w + ξ[π(e∗)b+ πˆ(e∗)bL] + (1− ξ)Q(e∗) ≥ ψ(e∗), (13)
where
Q(e) ≡ π(e)
Z
Σ
f(σ | B)h¯(σ, B)dσ + πˆ(e)
Z
Σ
f(σ | BL)h¯(σ, BL)dσ
+[1− π(e)− πˆ(e)]
Z
Σ
f(σ | 0)h¯(σ, 0)dσ.
Comparing, the present rule with the flat-rule in Section 4.2, notice that
now the expected bonus conditional on no compelling evidence about quality
Q is no longer fixed, but it depends on exerted eﬀort. Also, the arbitration
rule does aﬀect the incentive-compatibility constraints of the agent regarding
eﬀort, even after defining bonuses as ξt(y). In fact, if Q0 > 0 (respectively
Q0 < 0), then the arbitration (non-flat) rule relaxes (respectively restricts) the
incentive-compatibility constraints of inducing higher eﬀort levels. Note that
the monotonicity and concavity of Q depends on the arbitration rule and the
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information technology f(σ, y). Specifically, define
∆Qi ≡ ∆πi
Z
Σ
[f(σ | B)h¯(σ, B)− f(σ | 0)h¯(σ, 0)]dσ
+∆πˆi
Z
Σ
[f(σ | BL)h¯(σ, BL)− f(σ | 0)h¯(σ, 0)]dσ
for i = 1, 2. Then the implementation of increases in eﬀort becomes easier
if ∆Qi > 0 for i = 1, 2. Also, the agent’s problem is well-behaved, in the
sense that the eﬀective cost of exerting eﬀort ψ(e) − (1 − ξ)Q(e) is convex, if
∆ψ2 − (1 − ξ)∆Q2 ≥ ∆ψ1 − (1 − ξ)∆Q1. Given the aﬃliation of signals and
outcomes, we have that if the arbitration rule is output independent and the
bonus is increasing with signals24 - that is, if h¯2(σ, y) ≡ 0 and h¯1(σ, .) ≥ 0 -
then Q is increasing and concave function of the eﬀort. Thus, ∆Q1 ≥ ∆Q2 ≥ 0
and the incentive-compatibility constraints for increases in eﬀort are relaxed,
and the agent’s problem is well behaved. Note that a state indepedent ruling
emerges if and only if h(σ, y, y) = h(σ, y0, y0) for any y, y0 ∈ {0, BL, B}; that is if
and only if when disputing parties make the same claims then the bonus is only
responsive to the received signal σ. As we have seen above, this can emerge when
the expected bonus, after eﬀort has been exerted, is performance-independent
when a non-trivial dispute arises. In the case of ‘fair’ arbitration rules which
are increasing in truthful reports we have,25 given aﬃliation, that
R
Σ f(σ |
y)h¯(σ, y)dσ is increasing with y, and thereby Q is increasing and concave if
24Note that due to aﬃliation, higher signal imply higher likelihood that performance is high,
and so it does make sense to focus on ‘fair’ arbitration rules h¯1(σ, y) ≥ 0.
25Note that due to aﬃliation, higher signal imply higher likelihood that performance is high,
and so it does make sense to focus on ‘fair’ arbitration rules h¯1(σ, y) ≥ 0.
31
signals and truthful reports are not suﬃciently high complements.26 Assume
hereafter that ∆Q1 ≥ ∆Q2 ≥ 0.
Interestingly, depending on technologies, the first-best can be implemented
by means of an appropriate arbitration rule.
Proposition 3 If there is a function h¯(.) such that ∆Q1 ≥ ∆ψ1/(1− ξ) and
∆Q2 ≤ ∆ψ2/(1− ξ), then the principal oﬀers no bonuses and the agent exerts
the first-best eﬀort level ε.
Proof: Given zero bonuses the agent chooses the eﬀort that maximizes his
expected benefit from the contract being through arbitration net of cost of eﬀort
(1− ξ)Q(e)− ψ(e). So, ε is the eﬀort exerted by the agent if ∆Q1 ≥ ∆ψ1/(1−
ξ) and ∆Q2 ≤ ∆ψ2/(1 − ξ). As ε is the first-best level of eﬀort and it can
be implemented at minimum possible cost to ensure participation and limited
liability, i.e. by means of zero bonuses and w = max{0,ψ(ε)− (1− ξ)Q(ε)}, the
principal finds it optimal, given the arbitration rule h¯(.), to do so.¥
Note that there is nothing in the model to presume a certain ordering be-
tween ∆Q1/∆ψ1 and ∆Q2/∆ψ2. So a necessary condition for the first-best level
of eﬀort being implementable with zero bonuses is that ∆Q2/∆ψ2 ≥ ∆Q1/∆ψ1.
It turns out, that there can also be arbitration rules h¯() that lead to over-
investment regardless of the contract oﬀered by the principal.
26Note that integration be parts gives that
R
Σ f(σ | y)h¯(σ, y)dσ −
R
Σ f(σ | y)h¯(σ, y0)dσ,
where y > y0, equals h¯(σ¯, y) − h¯(σ¯, y0) − {RΣ[F (σ | y)h¯σ(σ, y)−F (σ | y0)h¯σ(σ, y0)]dσ}, where
σ¯ is the supremum of Σ. Thus
R
Σ f(σ | y)h¯(σ, y)dσ is increasing if
R
Σ[F (σ | y)h¯σ(σ, y)−F (σ |
y0)h¯σ(σ, y0)]dσ ≤ h¯(σ¯, y) − h¯(σ¯, y0), where the right hand side is non-negative. This in turn
implies, given that F (σ | y)h¯σ(σ, y) ≤ F (σ | y0) due to aﬃliation, that the expected bonus
administered by the arbitrator is increasing with the state if F (σ | y)h¯σ(σ, y)/h¯σ(σ, y0) is not
very much higher than F (σ | y0)/F (σ | y) (which is at least equal to 1).
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Proposition 4 If the arbitration rule h¯() is such that ∆Q1 +∆Q2 ≥ (∆ψ1 +
∆ψ2)/(1− ξ) and ∆Q2 > ∆ψ2/(1− ξ) then the principal oﬀers no bonuses and
the agent exerts maximum eﬀort level 1.
Proof: Suppose that the principal oﬀers zero bonus. If verifiability is suf-
ficiently low so that the above conditions hold, the agent exerts maximizes
(1 − ξ)Q(e) − ψ(e) by exerting eﬀort e = 1. Notice, however, that bonus will
reinforce the incentive to exert eﬀort. So, regardless of the contract, maximum
eﬀort level is optimal for the agent. As this eﬀort level can be implemented
at minimum possible cost to ensure participation and limited liability, i.e. by
means of zero bonuses and w = max{0,ψ(1)− (1− ξ)Q(1)}, the principal finds
it optimal to oﬀer zero bonuses.¥
Note that despite the fact that the ordering between∆Q2/∆ψ2 and∆Q1/∆ψ1
depends on the fundamentals of the model, we have that (∆Q1+∆Q2)/(∆ψ1+
∆ψ2) always lies between ∆Q2/∆ψ2 and ∆Q1/∆ψ1.
The above analysis highlights the fact that optimal eﬀort level ε and the
maximum eﬀort level 1 can both be implemented (with zero bonuses) under
certain circumstances. This is, primarily, due to the fact that the agent is able
to recover some of the costs of exerting eﬀort by going to court. In the above,
the costs the agent can recover are suﬃcient to induce her to exert eﬀort, and,
so, the principal oﬀers low-powered incentive contracts.
If, however, the recovered costs are suﬃciently low and/or verifiability is
suﬃciently high - in particular, in the remaining case of 1−ξ < min{∆ψ1/∆Q1,
(∆ψ1+∆ψ2)/(∆Q1+∆Q2)} - zero eﬀort is the outcome. To see this, note that
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when the agent is faced with zero bonuses she exerts no eﬀort. In this case, as
in the case of complete verifiability inducing positive eﬀort will come at a cost
to the principal. It turns out that the relevant monetary costs are lower than
the benefits, and hence the principal will find it optimal to induce no eﬀort. To
see the latter, note that now the problem the principal faces is analogous to the
one under compete verifiability, with the diﬀerence that now eﬀective bonuses
are b0 = ξb and b0L = ξbL, and the eﬀective cost to the agent from eﬀort e is
ψ(e) − (1− ξ)Q(e).
Following the discussion of the optimal complete contract in the previous Sec-
tion we then have that the contract under non-verifiability is bL = 0, b =
Z(e∗)
ξ ,
w = max{0,ψ(e∗) − (1 − ξ)Q(e∗) − Z(e∗)π(e∗)}. In addition, total monetary
costs are max{ψ(e∗), (1− ξ)Q(e∗) + Z(e∗)π(e∗)}.
Clearly then total monetary costs under arbitration are weakly higher than
monetary costs under complete verifiability, for any given level of eﬀort. In
fact, after recalling that Z(ε)π(ε) > ψ(ε) and Z(0) = ψ(0) = 0 we have that
the monetary cost of inducing zero eﬀort is (1 − ξ)Q(0) ≥ 0, while that of
inducing eﬀort ε is Z(ε)π(ε) + (1 − ξ)Q(ε). Clearly, then the extra monetary
cost of inducing eﬀort ε instead of 0 is Z(ε)π(ε) + (1− ξ)∆Q1 ≥ Z(ε)π(ε) and
thereby zero eﬀort still dominates the intermediate level of eﬀort ε. However,
zero eﬀort may no longer dominate full eﬀort. To see this, note first that if
π(1)Z(1) > ψ(1), i.e. if full eﬀort cannot be implemented under verifiability
at minimum cost while ensuring individual-rationality, then the extra monetary
cost of inducing eﬀort 1 instead of 0, under non-verifiability and arbitration, is
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equal to Z(1)π(1)+(1−ξ)(∆Q1+∆Q2) ≥ Z(1)π(1). Therefore, zero eﬀort still
dominates the full eﬀort. That is, in this case, zero eﬀort is again the outcome.
Similarly, if π(1)Z(1) ≤ ψ(1) ≤ π(1)Z(1) + (1 − ξ)Q(1) and Z(1)π(1) + (1 −
ξ)(∆Q1+∆Q2) ≥ ψ(1) then the extra monetary cost of inducing eﬀort 1 instead
of 0 under non-verifiability and arbitration max{π(1)Z(1)+(1−ξ)Q(1),ψ(1)}−
(1 − ξ)Q(0), is (weakly) higher than the extra cost when ξ = 1, ψ(1). Again
zero eﬀort is the outcome. In the remaining cases, however, the extra monetary
cost of inducing eﬀort 1 instead of 0 under non-verifiability and arbitration is
(weakly) lower than the extra cost when ξ = 1, ψ(1). This, in turn, implies that
full eﬀort can now dominate zero eﬀort, and thereby be optimal.27 Specifically,
we have
Proposition 5 Suppose that under verifiability of performance the exerted
eﬀort is zero. Then, under incomplete verifiability and arbitration, zero ef-
fort is as well the outcome unless π(1)Z(1) ≤ ψ(1) and max{π(1)Z(1) + (1 −
ξ)Q(1),ψ(1)} − (1 − ξ)Q(ε) < [∆πˆ1 +∆πˆ2]BL + [∆π1 +∆π2]B. If the latter
is true then full eﬀort is exerted.
In the next Section, we investigate a dispute-resolution rule which does not
induce truth-telling, and yet can be welfare improving under certain conditions.
An interesting implication of this rule is that the use of additional information
about the non-verifiable state may not be crucial
27Note that if full eﬀort dominates zero eﬀort, and zero eﬀort dominates the intermediate
eﬀort, then full eﬀort also dominates the intermediate eﬀort.
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6 Mediation
Now we consider a dispute resolution mechanism that relies on a mediator.
Recall from Section 2 that here we have in mind the arbitration process protocol
described by the American Arbitrator Association28 and ACAS. A mediator
listens to the reports about the state of nature from the two conflicting parties
and then makes a ruling based on the reports. The protocol described by both
ACAS and the American Arbitrator Association emphasizes minimizing cost of
the information gathering process. We will assume that this means that the
mediator is unable to induce truth-revelation.
In more detail, we consider the following rule. The mediation rule aims
at enforcing the original contract whenever the parties agree on the bonus the
agent is to receive or whenever there is compelling evidence about the state.
In all other cases, the rule is compromising, i.e. it decides on a bonus which
is between the parties’ claims. The rule in mind is also anonymous, in the
sense that the ruling is based only on the original contract, the claims and any
additional information, and not on the identity of the claimants. Finally, the rule
is monotonic, in the sense that the bonus to the agent - if parties disagree and
the court has found no compelling evidence about the state - is non-decreasing
in the parties’ claims.
Specifically, suppose that the agent’s bonus - when a party goes to court
and there is no compelling evidence about the state - is determined by the rule
h(σ,ma,mp), ma,mp ∈ {0, bL, b}, where ma and mp are the reports provided
28http://www.adr.org
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by the agent and the principal respectively about the state of the world to the
court,
h(σ,ma,mp) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
m if ma = mp = m
β(σ,ma,mp) = β(σ,mp,ma) ∈ (ma,mp) if ma 6= mp
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
,(14)
and β2 ≥ 0,β3 ≥ 0. (15)
Given this rule, and after reintroducing the dependence of δ0s on the claims,
we have that the state-dependent expected benefits of the agent from going to
court are δ(0,ma,mp) = (1 − ξ)
R
Σ f(σ | 0)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ, δ(BL,ma,mp) =
(1 − ξ)[
R
Σ f(σ | BL)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ − bL] and δ(B,ma,mp) = (1 − ξ)[
R
Σ f(σ |
B)h(σ,ma,mp)dσ − b]. Given the implied anticipated state-dependent payoﬀs,
we can find if a dispute will arise. In particular, we have that, given the state
y, the parties have to decide whether they will go to court or not, and, if they
do challenge the state, what claim will they make.
Using backward-induction, we have that parties are involved in the following
state-dependent zero-sum ‘lawsuit’ game (the following matrix contains only the
payoﬀ of the agent)
ma\mp 0 bL b
0 t(y) + δ(y, 0, 0) t(y) + δ(y, 0, bL) t(y) + δ(y, 0, b)
bL t(y) + δ(y, 0, bL) t(y) + δ(y, bL, bL) t(y) + δ(y, bL, b)
b t(y) + δ(y, 0, b) t(y) + δ(y, bL, b) t(y) + δ(y, b, b)
. (16)
Let hereafter that b ≥ bL. This comes without loss of generality, as it is shown
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in Appendix 2. Given that ma = b and mp = 0 are weakly dominant strate-
gies for the agent and the principal, respectively, we have that state-dependent
equilibrium bonus to the agent - conditional on the state being challenged - is
δ(y, b, 0), and thereby, in deciding whether to go to court or not, the parties are
involved in the following zero-sum game
A\P challenge not
challenge t(y) + δ(y, b, 0) t(y) + δ(y, b, 0)
not t(y) + δ(y, b, 0) t(y)
. (17)
Clearly, as long as δ(y, b, 0) is non-zero, a dispute will always arise. If δ(y, b, 0) >
0 the agent challenges the state y, while if δ(y, b, 0) < 0 it is the principal
who goes to court. The only environment in which a dispute never arises is
when δ(y, b, 0) = 0 for any y, which, in turn, amounts to having a contract
with bL = b = 0 and thereby h(σ, b, 0) = 0 for any σ. It follows that, unless
b = bL = 0, a dispute will always occur regardless of the state of the world.29
Therefore, the ex ante (i.e. prior to the eﬀort being exerted) expected bonus
29Suppose that b > 0, b ≥ bL ≥ 0. The mediation rule then implies that h(σ, b, 0) > 0 for
any σ. Thus, under state y = 0 the agent goes to court. The compromising nature of the
judicial rule and f > 0 implies also that
R
Σ f(σ | B)h(σ, b, 0)dσ < b, and so under state y = B
the principal goes to court. In state y = BL we have that if
R
Σ f(σ | BL)h(σ, b, 0)dσ < bL the
agent goes to court, while if
R
Σ f(σ | BL)h(σ, b, 0)dσ > bL the principal challenges the state.
In the final case of y = BL and
R
Σ f(σ | BL)h(σ, b, 0)dσ = bL the parties are indiﬀerent; to
simplify exposition, though, we implicitly assume that some party will go to court.
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is ξt(y) + (1− ξ)η(e, b, 0), where
η(e, b, 0) ≡
π(e)
Z
Σ
f(σ | B)h(σ, b, 0)dσ + πˆ(e)
Z
Σ
f(σ | BL)h(σ, b, 0)dσ
+[1− π(e)− πˆ(e)]
Z
Σ
f(σ | 0)h(σ, b, 0)dσ.
and the principal oﬀers the contract {w, bL, b} that solves the following problem:
max
w≥0,bL≥0,b≥bL
π(e∗)[B − ξb] + πˆ(e∗)[BL − ξbL]− (1− ξ)η(e∗, b, 0)− w (18)
subject to e∗ = argmax
e
ξ[π(e)b+ πˆ(e)bL] + (1− ξ)η(e, b, 0)− ψ(e) (19)
w + ξ[π(e∗)b+ πˆ(e∗)bL] + (1− ξ)η(e∗, b, 0) ≥ ψ(e∗). (20)
As in the case of the arbitration rule, the non-verifiability of information and the
presence of a mediator that uses the rule h(σ,ma,mb) described above implies
that given any contract {w, bL, b} the actual expected cost to the principal is
(1 − ξ)η(e, b, 0) + w + ξ[π(e)b + πˆ(e)bL]. Thus, the cost Q is replaced by the
cost η which now also depends on the claims made by both parties, and, in
particular, on the bonus b. Note that η(., 0, 0) = 0, and hence zero eﬀort can be
induced by oﬀering the flat-contract with w = b = bL = 0.
Notice that a direct implication of the cost being η(e, b, 0), with η2(e, b, 0) ≥
0, instead of Q is that increasing the bonus b increases the extend at which the
participation constraint is relaxed. Also, as long as eﬀort aﬀects positively η
and the agent’s report and eﬀort are complements in the mediation rule, we
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have that increasing the bonus b increases the extend at which the incentive
compatibility constraints of increasing eﬀort is relaxed. In what follows, we
derive the contract oﬀered by the principal and the implemented eﬀort.
6.1 Signal-Unresponsive Rule
We discuss two cases, first where the mediator does not use or possesses ad-
ditional information on non-verifiable states and second where the mediator
possesses and uses all additional information regarding performance. In this
subsection, we assume that the rule uses only the claims to decide on the bonus
to the worker when no compelling evidence exists about the state, with the
remaining case discussed in the following sub-section.
So here the mediator does not get any additional signal σ. The mediator
cannot gather any new information on her own, therefore she has to base the
ruling on the information provided by the contracting parties. This assumption
is justified, as we have discussed in Section 2, by the fact that mediators often,
in order to reduce the cost of dispute resolution, do not gather information
themselves. Therefore, here, the mediator’s ruling is, h(σ, b, 0) ≡ h˜(b, 0) for any
σ ∈ Σ, and as a result η is not eﬀected by eﬀort. Thus, mediation here does
not, in contrast to arbitration, relax the incentive-compatibility constraints of
increasing eﬀort.
Here, also, the marginal benefit for the agent, decreases with eﬀort and
increases with the bonuses oﬀered by the principal. Recall that if the principal
oﬀers no bonuses then the agent exerts no eﬀort (and no dispute arises). Thus,
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the agent’s problem is well-defined. In addition, if the mediation rule is a convex
function of bonus b then the principal’s cost minimization, for any given positive
eﬀort, problem is also well-behaved. Assume hereafter that this is indeed the
case.
Note that if ξ = 0 then the agent exerts zero eﬀort, as he expects to receive
w + (1 − ξ)η(., b, 0) regardless of his eﬀort. As ψ(0) = η(., 0, 0) = 0, we have
that the principal can ensure minimum costs, by setting b = bL = w = 0. Recall
that this is also the outcome under a flat rule when ξ = 0.
Let now ξ > 1. Define also
b∗L(e) =
∆πj [Z(e)− ξb∗(e)]
ξ∆πˆj
, (21)
b∗(e) = arg max
b∈[ γ(e)Z(e)ξ ,
Z(e)
ξ ]
{ξΓ(e)b− (1− ξ)η(., b, 0)}, (22)
γ(e) ≡ ∆πj
∆πˆj +∆πj
, (23)
Γ(e) ≡ πˆ(e)∆πj
∆πˆj
− π(e), with e > 0 and j = 1 if e = ε, and j = 2 if e = 1.(24)
Note that due to MLRP we have Γ(e) > 0. It follows then, after follow-
ing the steps in the complete contract scenario, that if ψ(e) ≥ ξ[π(e)b∗(e) +
πˆ(e)b∗L(e)] + (1 − ξ)η(., b∗(e), 0) ≡ C∗(ξ, e), then the principal can induce the
eﬀort level e > 0 by means of a contract bL = b∗L(e), b = b
∗(e) and w =
ψ(e) − ξ[π(e)b∗(e) + πˆ(e)b∗L(e)] + (1 − ξ)η(., b∗(e), 0) ≥ 0. This follows directly
from observing that under such contract the participation constraint is just sat-
isfied and the agent finds it to her benefit to exert eﬀort e. Thus, in this case,
the existence of mediation leads to production at minimum cost ψ(e), as in the
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first-best outcome, despite asymmetric information regarding eﬀort.
If, however, ψ(e) < C∗(ξ, e) then asymmetric information regarding eﬀort
has a bite when it comes to inducing eﬀort level e. In particular, now, if the
principal wants to induce a positive level of eﬀort e, he would need to incur a
total cost of C∗(ξ, e). The formal derivation of this is can be found in Appendix
3. Here we only present the intuition. As the problem of the agent is well-
behaved, the minimum monetary cost, for any given down-payment w, at which
the principal can induce eﬀort level e > 0 is attained when the ‘downward local
incentive compatibility constraint’ is binding, i.e.
ξ[∆πˆjbL +∆πjb] = ∆ψj , j = 1, 2.
As in the complete contract scenario, the above equation for j = 1 comes
from the indiﬀerence of the agent between exerting eﬀort level ε and no ef-
fort; similarly for j = 2. It follows that bL =
∆πj [Z(e)−ξb]
ξ∆πˆj
. So, the bonuses,
when the quality is of an intermediate and high level, are substitutes. Recall
that for any given down-payment w, that the expected cost to the principal
is ξ[πb + πˆbL] + (1 − ξ)η(., b, 0).Therefore increasing the bonus when the out-
come is a success leads to a gain ξΓ(e) from the bonuses paid when there is
compelling evidence about the state, an at a cost (1 − ξ)η(., b, 0) from the
bonuses paid when the state is not verified. The principal is constrained by
the requirement that b ≥ bL ≥ 0 and the agent’s participation constraint that
ξ[π(e)b+ πˆ(e)bL]+(1−ξ)η(., b, 0)+w ≥ ψ(e). Notice that b ≥ bL ≥ 0 translates
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into b ∈ [γ(e)Z(e)ξ ,
Z(e)
ξ ]. Since ψ(e) < C
∗(ξ, e) and w ≥ 0, we clearly, then, have
that the participation constraint is slack. Therefore, b = b∗(e) and b∗L(e). As
down-payments are costly we also have that w = 0. So the total cost of inducing
e is indeed C∗(ξ, e).
Accordingly, for any given eﬀort level the principal wants to induce, the
contract has b = b∗(e) and b∗L(e) and w = max{0,ψ(e) − C∗(ξ, e)}, and total
production costs are given by max{ψ(e), C∗(ξ, e)}. It follows that if ξΓ(e) ≤
(1 − ξ)ηb(., γZξ , 0) then the principal finds it optimal to oﬀer the same bonus
whenever the project is not a failure, i.e. b = bL =
γ(e)Z(e)
ξ . Furthermore, if
(1− ξ)ηb(.,
γ(e)Z(e)
ξ , 0) < ξΓ(e) < (1− ξ)ηb(.,
Z(e)
ξ , 0) then the principal finds it
optimal to oﬀers some bonus, though lower than b, at the intermediate state of
performance. Specifically, the principal oﬀers, at the state of success, bonus bˆ(e),
which is the solution of ξΓ(e) = (1 − ξ)ηb(., b, 0). That is, the bonus when the
project is a success balances the trade-oﬀ between higher incentives and higher
cost due to non-verifiability. Also, we have that bL =
∆πj
∆πˆj
[Z(e)ξ − bˆ(e)] ≡ bˆL(e).
Finally, if ξΓ(e) ≥ (1−ξ)ηb(.,
Z(e)
ξ , 0) then, despite the fact that non-verifiability
does increase the principal’s costs at the margin, increasing bonus b as much
as possible is still optimal. Thus, b = Z(e)ξ , bL = 0. Note, that this contractual
form is the one under complete contracts, adjusted for the possibility of non-
verifiability (ξ < 1) and that non-verifiability increases the monetary costs by
(1− ξ)η(., b, 0).
The above discussion highlights that under non-verifiability and the medi-
ation rule in question, the contractual form of the principal inducing a certain
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level of eﬀort may be diﬀerent than that under verifiability. Summarizing, we
have:
Proposition 6 For suﬃciently high values of ξ then a given positive eﬀort
level e is induced by oﬀering a bonus only when the project is a success, b =
Z(e)
ξ , bL = 0. If value of ξ is suﬃciently low then the bonuses are the same when
the project is not a failure b = bL =
γe)Z(e)
ξ . Otherwise for intermediate levels
of ξ a bonus is also oﬀered at the intermediate performance level Z(e)ξ > b =
bˆ(e) > γe)Z(e)ξ > bL = bˆL(e).
Proof: The proof follows directly from above discussion, after defining two
threshold levels of degree of verifiability ξl and ξh, with ξl < ξh, by the solutions
of ξΓ = (1− ξ)ηb(., γZξ , 0) and ξΓ = (1− ξ)ηb(.,
Z
ξ , 0), respectively.¥
It is interesting to note that this Proposition emphasizes that even under
non-verifiability incentives are not flat. This will be true as long as there is an
eﬀective mechanism to resolve any disputes arising from the non-verifiability.
In particular, the agent is provided incentives, with the power of incentives
being increasing with the degree of verifiability. We see that high powered
incentives can be provided even under non verifiability, i.e., if ξ ≥ ξh and hence
bL = 0. Interestingly, verifiability increases the amount paid at the intermediate
performance decreases; if ξ ≥ ξh then b = Z/ξ. This something which we would
expect, since higher verifiability would facilitate the provision of incentives.
Next, we turn to the determination of the optimal eﬀort induced for varying
degrees of non-verifiability given by the variable ξ. We have
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Proposition 7 The first-best level of eﬀort is optimal if ξ < ξh(ε), and ∆πˆ1BL+
∆π1B ≥ max{ξ[π(ε)b(ξ, ε) + πˆ(ε)bL(ξ, ε)] + (1 − ξ)η(., b(ξ, ε), 0), ψ(ε)} and
∆πˆ2BL + ∆π2B ≤ max{ξ[π(1)b(ξ, 1) + πˆ(1)bL(ξ, 1)]ξ + (1 − ξ)η(., b(ξ, 1), 0),
ψ(1)} − max{ξ[π(ε)b(ξ, ε)+ πˆ(ε)bL(ξ, ε)]ξ+(1− ξ)η(., b(ξ, ε), 0), ψ(ε)} , where
bL(ξ, e) = ∆π1∆πˆ1 [
Z(e)
ξ − b(ξ, e)] and b(ξ, e) = bˆ(e) if ξ > ξl(e), b(ξ) =
γ(e)Z(e)
ξ if
ξ ≤ ξl(e).
Proof. See Appendix 4
Proposition 8 Full eﬀort is optimal if ξ < ξh(1), and (∆πˆ1+∆πˆ2)BL+(∆π1+
∆π2)B ≥ max{ξ[π(1)b(ξ, 1) + πˆ(1)bL(ξ, 1)] + (1 − ξ)η(., b(ξ, 1), 0), ψ(1)} and
∆πˆ2BL + ∆π2B > max{ξ[π(1)b(ξ, 1) + πˆ(1)bL(ξ, 1)]ξ + (1 − ξ)η(., b(ξ, 1), 0),
ψ(1)} − max{ξ[π(ε)b(ξ, ε)+ πˆ(ε)bL(ξ, ε)]ξ+(1− ξ)η(., b(ξ, ε), 0), ψ(ε)} , where
bL(ξ, e) = ∆π1∆πˆ1 [
Z(e)
ξ − b(ξ, e)] and b(ξ, e) = bˆ(e) if ξ > ξl(e), b(ξ) =
γ(e)Z(e)
ξ if
ξ ≤ ξl(e).
Proof. See Appendix 4
Corollary 9 A necessary condition for some positive eﬀort level to be opti-
mal is that this eﬀort level must be induced by oﬀering some bonuses at the
intermediate performance state.
The intuition should be clear by now: if bonuses are given only if the project
is a success the total monetary costs are (weakly) higher that those under com-
plete verifiability, with the latter being suﬃciently high to ensure zero eﬀort if
ξ = 1.
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6.2 Signal-responsive Rule
We now return to the general case of η(e, b, 0). As the rule h(σ, b, 0) is inde-
pendent of the state, aﬃliation implies that if the rule is ‘fair’, i.e. h1 ≥ 0,
then η(e, b, 0) is an increasing and concave function of eﬀort. Assume also that
η(e, b, 0) is convex with respect to the agent’s report, to ensure that the princi-
pal’s problem is well-behaved.
This rule combines elements from the arbitration and the signal-unresponsive
mediation rule. In particular, by letting, with some abuse of notation, ∆Q2 =
η(1, 0, 0)−η(ε, 0, 0) and∆Q1 = η(ε, 0, 0)−η(0, 0, 0) one can see that Propositions
3 and 4 are hold here as well: first-best or full eﬀort are implemented due the
participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint for increases
in eﬀort be relaxed.
When, on the other hand, 1−ξ < ∆ψ1/∆Q1 and 1−ξ ≤ (∆ψ1+∆ψ2)/(∆Q1+
∆Q2) we have that zero bonuses induce zero eﬀort. Note also that due to con-
vexity of ψ and concavity of π, πˆ and η(e, ., .) we have that ensuring the ‘lo-
cal downward’ incentive compatibility constraint for some positive eﬀort level
e implies that e is also preferred to the other eﬀort levels. Then, we have
in a similar manner to that in Section 6.1 that w = max{0,ψ(e) − C¯(ξ, e)},
b¯(e) = argmaxb∈[]{ξΓ(e)b−(1−ξ)[η(e, b, 0)− πˆj∆ηj(b)∆πˆj ]}, b¯L(e) =
∆πj [Z(e)−ξb¯(e)]
ξ∆πˆj
−
(1−ξ)∆ηj(b)
ξ∆πˆj
and total monetary costs are max{ψ(e), C¯(ξ, e)}, where C¯(ξ, e) ≡
ξ[π(e)b¯(e) + πˆ(e)b¯L(e)] + (1− ξ)η(e, b¯(e), 0), ∆η2(b) ≡ η(1, b, 0)− η(ε, b, 0) and
∆η1(b) ≡ η(ε, b, 0) − η(0, b, 0), with j = 1 if e = ε, and j = 2 if e = 1. That is,
as the extend to which incentive-compatibility is relaxed depends on the bonus
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b, the cost of increasing b has the additional cost
πˆjd∆ηj(b)
∆πˆjdb
, and the power of in-
centives is aﬀected accordingly. If the latter decreases, i.e. if
πˆjd∆ηj(b)
∆πˆjdb
< 0, then
monetary costs are lower, relative to the case with ξ = 1, thereby increasing the
cases of positive eﬀort levels being implemented.
7 Choosing either Mediation or Arbitration
In the previous sections we have not considered the choice of the disputing
parties regarding the mechanism used for dispute resolution. We have assumed
that the disputing parties are aware that either mediation is available to them
or arbitration is available to them. But in reality the disputing parties generally
make a choice where to get their disputes resolved. Disputing parties when they
register their dispute often have an option to get it resolved through a mediator
or take it to an arbitrator at the tribunal. The dispute can be taken to the
mediator only if both parties agree. If the dispute is taken to the mediator and
one party is not satisfied with the solution then the case ends up with arbitrator
at the tribunal. The ruling of the mediator is not legally binding while that of
the arbitrator generally is. This form can easily be incorporated into our model.
With a choice the players will always use the arbitration at the tribunal. The
reason being that the players play a zero sum game if they go to a mediator.
Since it is necessary that in order for mediation to occur both parties have to
agree, mediation will never take place due to this and they will end up going to
an arbitrator. So the outcome will be that the case will always be resolved at
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the tribunal by an arbitrator.
In certain industries it is compulsory to take a dispute to the mediator and
then take it to the arbitrator at the tribunal. In this case again the result
of the arbitration will be the equilibrium result. Again the reason being that
the players play a zero sum game at the mediation stage and mediation has
to be agreed by both parties and is not legally binding. Therefore at least
one party will always take the case further to arbitration. In our model, given
either simulataneous choice or sequential choice between the two mechanisms
the arbitration ruling will always hold. In case the game structure is such
that players can go to a mediator first and then to an arbitrator or make a
simultaneous choice between the two, mediation ruling may be accepted by
both players if there is an added cost to going to arbitration. This cost may be
greater time required or more resources since arbitration generally takes more
time and resources. In such a case mediation rule would dominate.
8 Conclusion
It is often not possible to write contracts where performance is measured pre-
cisely and within firms and organizations this may lead to disputes and griev-
ances. Firms and organizations realize this and often they have well defined and
extensive mechanism in their job code to deal with such cases. If there are no
such provisions within the organization, the disputes either go to arbitrators out
of the organizations or to the courts. In the analysis above we look into two pos-
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sible dispute resolution mechanism or rules and the eﬀect it would have on the
ex ante contract written and the eﬀort level of the agent which can be induced.
In case of a dispute resolution mechanism which induces truthful reporting the
result will be low-powered incentives or a flat contract while if the mechanism
is such that it just follows the reporting of the participants without forcing to
report honestly about what they observe a high powered incentive contract can
be written. This provides another rationale why firms may write a contract pro-
viding low powered incentives as opposed to high powered incentives. Over the
last few decades there has been increasing use of alternative dispute resolutions.
In certain industrial sectors use of ADRs have become compulsory. The main
advantage of ADRs over tribunals or courts is that it is less costly.
We believe that this framework can be applied to various other incentive
problems. In public sector for instance, where most organizations are complex,
it may be extremely diﬃcult to write a fully verifiable contracts. This makes it
diﬃcult to write incentive contracts. But we see that given a mechanis to deal
with the non verfiability of contracts, incentive contracts can be written. Other
areas include providing incentives in teams, where contributions from diﬀerent
agents may be diﬃcult to measure. We believe that addressing this issue of
non verifiablity fills an important gap in the theory of contracts between the
incomplete literature and the complete contract literature.
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These Appendices are available upon request.
11 Appendix 4
• Case 1: ξΓ(ε) ≥ (1 − ξ)ηb(., Z(ε)ξ , 0) and ξΓ(1) ≥ (1 − ξ)ηb(., Z(1)ξ , 0), or
equivalently ξ ≥ max{ξh(ε), ξh(1)}. In this case, any positive level of eﬀort
is induced by oﬀering no bonuses at the intermediate level of performance.
That is, bL = 0 and b(e) = Z(e)/ξ. Hence, the induced eﬀort maximizes
π(e)B+πˆ(e)BL−max{ψ(e),π(e)Z(e)+(1−ξ)η(., Z(e)ξ , 0)}, with Z(0) ≡ 0.
Clearly, then, due to η(., 0, 0) = 0 and that zero eﬀort is induced under
verifiability, and that monetary costs are (weakly) higher than those under
full verifiability we have that zero eﬀort is still optimal for the principal
under non-verifiability.
• Case 2: ξ ≥ ξh(ε) and ξ < ξh(1). In this case, eﬀort level ε is induced
by means of bonuses {bL = 0, b = Z(ε)/ξ}, while eﬀort level 1 is induced
with bonuses {b∗L(1), b∗(1)} where b∗(1) < Z(1)ξ . Here, optimal eﬀort may
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be positive, depending on the parameters. Nevertheless, it will not be the
first-best one, as the cost of inducing it, here, is even higher than under ver-
ifiability. In particular, note that ∆πˆ1BL+∆π1B ≤ max{π(ε)Z(ε),ψ(ε)}
≤ max{π(ε)Z(ε)+(1− ξ)η(., Z(ε)ξ , 0),ψ(ε)}, where the first inequality fol-
lows from the fact that zero eﬀort is the outcome under verifiability and
the second inequality follows from the additional cost (1 − ξ)η(., Z(ε)ξ , 0)
the principal faces under non-verifiability. Thus, here, if positive eﬀort is
optimal it must be the maximum one. In fact, e = 1 is preferred to e = 0
if
(∆πˆ1+∆πˆ2)BL+(∆π1+∆π2)B > max{ξ[π(1)b∗(1)+πˆ(1)b∗L(1)]+(1−ξ)η(., bˆ(1), 0),ψ(1)}
Note that the latter inequality can, in principle be true, despite the fact
that zero eﬀort is optimal under verifiability and the cost of inducing
eﬀort 1 instead of 0 is weakly higher by (1 − ξ)η(., Z(ε)ξ , 0) under non-
verifiability. The reason is that ξb∗(1) (which is strictly lower than Z(1))
may be suﬃciently lower than Z(1) to compensate for the higher bonus
under the intermediate state of performance and for the higher actual cost
due to non-verifiability.
• Case 3: ξ < ξh(ε) and ξ ≥ ξh(1). In this case, eﬀort level ε is induced
by means of bonuses {b∗L(ε), b∗(ε)}, where b∗(ε) < Z(ε)ξ , while eﬀort level
1 is induced with bonuses {bL = 0, b = Z(1)/ξ}. Repeating the steps
above, we have that eﬀort level 1 is dominated by zero eﬀort level, given
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that the latter is optimal under verifiability and under non-verifiability the
principal’s actual cost (weakly) increases by (1− ξ)η(., Z(1)ξ , 0). However,
the first-best level may now be optimal. This will be the case if
max{π(ε)b∗(ε)+ πˆ(ε)b∗L(ε)+(1− ξ)η(., b∗(ε), 0),ψ(ε)} ≤ ∆πˆ1BL+∆π1B.
Similarly30 to Case 2, note that the latter inequality can, in principle
may be true, despite the fact that zero eﬀort is optimal under verifiability
and the cost of inducing eﬀort ε instead of 0 is (weakly) higher by (1 −
ξ)η(., b∗(ε), 0) under non-verifiability. The reason is that ξb∗(ε) (which is
strictly lower than Z(ε)) may be suﬃciently lower than Z(ε) to compensate
for the higher bonus under the intermediate state of performance and for
the higher actual cost due to non-verifiability.
• Case 4: ξ < ξh(ε) and ξ < ξh(1). In this case, eﬀort level ε is induced
by means of bonuses {bˆL(ε), bˆ(ε)}, where recall that bˆ(ε) < Z(ε)ξ , and
eﬀort level 1 is induced with bonuses {b∗L(1), b∗(1)} where b∗(1) < Z(1)ξ .
Therefore, combining the arguments in Cases 2 and 3 we have that, de-
pending on the parameters, either eﬀort level could be optimal. Incentive
compatibility provides us with the obvious conditions.
30Note that ε dominating full eﬀort follows from full eﬀort being dominated by zero eﬀort,
and zero eﬀort be dominated by ε.
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